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 Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic 
goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention 
paid to the notion of checking. This is the fi rst book to develop a 
comprehensive epistemic theory of checking. The author argues that 
sensitivity is necessary for checking but not for knowing, thereby fi nding 
a new home for the much discussed modal sensitivity principle. He then 
uses the distinction between checking and knowing to explain central 
puzzles about knowledge, particularly those concerning knowledge 
closure, bootstrapping, and the skeptical puzzle.  Knowing and Checking: 
An Epistemological Investigation will be of interest to epistemologists and 
other philosophers looking for a general theory of checking and testing or 
for new solutions to central epistemological problems. 
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Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation 
 
Guido Melchior  
 
 
Chapter 1, Introduction 
 
This introductory Chapter provides an overview of “Knowing and Checking: An 
Epistemological Investigation” and its methodological approach. In Part I of the 
book, I develop a sensitivity account of checking. In Part II, I use this theory for 
explaining central puzzles about knowledge, for example the skeptical puzzle. 
Against orthodox epistemology, and especially against knowledge-first 
epistemology, my methodological approach is to provide an analysis of common 
but philosophically neglected epistemic concepts such as checking and to use this 
analysis to explain puzzles about knowledge. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Chapter 2, Modal Knowledge Accounts  
 
This Chapter provides an overview of modal knowledge accounts. In section 2.1, 
it present Nozick’s sensitivity based knowledge account and, in section 2.2, three 
well known problems for this account: insensitive inductive knowledge, 
implausible closure failure, and the problem of one-sided methods. In section 2.3, 
it discusses alternative sensitivity accounts as proposed by DeRose, Black, Roush 
and Becker that attempt to handle problems of insensitive knowledge and/or 
closure failure better than Nozick’s account does. Section 2.4 is devoted to the 
alternative modal principle of safety and problems for safety accounts of 
knowledge.  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Chapter 3,  SAC: A Sensitivity Account of Checking 
 
This Chapter develops a sensitivity account of checking. It begins by sketching 
two necessary conditions on checking, first that S uses the method with the 
intention of determining whether p is true and second that M is an appropriate 
method with respect to p. In section 3.1, it discusses the first condition, which 
specifies the intentional features of the checking subject. Furthermore, it 
introduces some terminology and distinguishes between ex ante reports about 
checking and ex post reports along with defining the technical notion of checking 
that p is true. Section 3.1 ends by providing a natural language analysis 
concerning ‘checking’ and related concepts such as ‘determining,’ ‘checking out,’ 
‘double-checking,’ ‘testing,’ and ‘settling a question.’ In the following sections, 
3.2-3.9, this chapter discusses the second condition on checking, which concerns 
the modal features of the method used. It defines any method that is appropriate 
with respect to p as a checking method for p. First, it provides a detailed account 
of modal features of methods instead of modal features of beliefs. Second, it 
sketches the features of ideal methods for checking whether p. Third, it argues 
that sensitivity is necessary for checking and, fourth, it explains why safety is not 
sufficient. Fifth, it contends that a sensitivity based checking account does not 
suffer from Luper-Foy’s problem of one-sided methods. Sixth, it elaborates 
necessary and sufficient conditions for checking methods that are asymmetric 
with respect to p and p. Seventh, it analyzes the relations between the provided 
account of checking and existing knowledge accounts. Finally, it is argued that 
the proposed checking account does not suffer from the generality problem and 
that Kripke’s barn façade example does not pose a counter-example.  
 
 
 
Chapter 4, Checking, Alternatives, and Discrimination 
 
The first part of Chapter 4,  extends the account of checking, developed in Chapter 
3. First, Chapter 4 provides a more fine-grained analysis of checking by 
distinguishing between cases like checking that it is true that Peter cleaned, 
checking that Peter (and not somebody else) cleaned the kitchen or checking that 
Peter cleaned the kitchen (and not something else). Second, it investigates 
checking with regard to particular alternatives, e.g. checking that Peter and not 
Frank cleaned the kitchen. Third, it analyzes checking plus wh-clauses, e.g. 
checking who cleaned the kitchen. In the second part of Chapter 4, it is shown 
how we can elaborate a theory of discriminating in analogy to the modal theory 
of checking viz. a theory about the conditions for having the capacity to 
discriminate Fs from Gs. The reader will see that sensitivity is not only necessary 
for checking but also for discriminating, i.e. S cannot discriminate Fs from Gs via 
M if, in the nearest possible worlds where x is G, M indicates that x is F.  
________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 5, Checking, Inferences, and Necessities  
 
Observation and the uses of technical devices are paradigmatic methods for 
checking. In these cases, the method often directly indicates that the target 
proposition is true (or indicates that it is false). However, in many cases we want 
to check a proposition whose truth or falsity observation or technical devices 
cannot indicate directly. In these cases, inferences may be involved in the 
checking processes. This chapter investigates which kinds of inferences can be 
involved in checking methods. In the first section, it presents Nozick’s sensitivity 
based account of inferential knowledge and its consequences for deduction, 
induction and abduction. The reader will see that some instances of deduction can 
yield knowledge but some others cannot. This is in line with Nozick’s take on 
knowledge closure. Moreover, some instances of induction cannot yield 
knowledge, as critics of Nozick point out, though some others can, a rather 
neglected fact. Abduction can yield inferential knowledge, on Nozick’s account, 
if the inference is one to the best explanation. Here Nozick’s account of inferential 
knowledge fits well with our intuitive understanding of proper abductive 
inferences. In the second section, it is shown that we get the same results for 
checking and it is argued that this does not pose a problem for SAC. The last 
section investigates checking of necessary truths. Orthodox semantics of 
counterfactual conditionals has it that any method trivially fulfills the sensitivity 
and safety condition for necessary truths. Thus, one should be able to check 
necessary truths by using any method, which is highly implausible. It is argued 
that non-orthodox semantics for counterfactuals that also takes into account 
impossible worlds avoids this problem and provides a natural extension of SAC 
to necessary truths.  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Chapter 6, SAC and Knowledge Puzzles 
 
Part I of ‘Knowing and Checking’ presents SAC, a sensitivity account of 
checking. Part II investigates how SAC can contribute to explaining and solving 
existing philosophical puzzles about knowledge. This part will not defend a 
particular account of knowledge. Consequently, it cannot and will not explicate 
the actual connections between checking and knowing. Nevertheless, SAC can be 
used for explaining existing puzzles about knowledge. This can be done by 
revealing the connections between checking and our intuitions about knowing, 
thereby leaving open whether our knowledge intuitions are actually right or 
wrong. Chapter 6 first develops the core connection between checking and 
intuitions about knowing. Second, it presents low-stakes/high-stakes puzzles and 
closure puzzles, along with existing solutions to these puzzles. Third, it discusses 
how SAC can explain low-stakes/high-stakes puzzles and contribute to existing 
solutions. Fourth, it undertakes this investigation for closure puzzles and 
compares the SAC-based explanation of closure puzzles to alternatives. It will be 
shown that our intuitions about checking and knowing can only explain some low-
stakes/high-stakes puzzles, but they provide the best explanation for closure 
puzzles. Various existing solutions to closure puzzles, such as strict and moderate 
invariantism and contextualism, are compatible with the SAC-based explanation.  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Chapter 7, Checking and Bootstrapping 
 
The first section of Chapter 7 contains a theory about checking and bootstrapping. 
The second section investigates how this theory can be used to explain and to 
solve knowledge puzzles about bootstrapping. It is first shown that inductive 
bootstrapping is a monotonous method that always indicates that the source in 
question is reliable regardless of whether it actually is reliable or not. For this 
reason, bootstrapping fails to be a method of checking a source’s reliability. This 
is also true for deductive bootstrapping and bootstrapping about the accuracy of 
a source’s indications. Some alternative ways of checking the reliability or 
accuracy of a source are investigated and it is concluded that these possibilities 
have certain limitations. Second, it is argued that we have to distinguish between 
checking that p, checking that a source O truly indicates that p and checking of 
O’s indication that p that it is true. This distinction will also be relevant in Chapter 
8 when various ways of checking whether one’s own beliefs are true are 
investigated. We will see that each of these checking processes has different 
sensitivity conditions and, consequently, different limitations. The second section 
of Chapter 7 investigates how SAC and KSAC can explain knowledge puzzles 
about bootstrapping and how they can contribute to solving them.  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 8, SAC and the Skeptical Puzzle 
 
This final chapter provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle and the Moorean 
puzzle that is based on a sensitivity account of checking, SAC. Section 8.1 surveys 
the contemporary debate about skepticism and Mooreanism. Section 8.2 presents 
a SAC-based explanation of the skeptical puzzle and the Moorean puzzle. It 
begins by discussing doubting and its relationship to checking one’s own beliefs, 
contrasting them with ordinary self-reflection. It argues that Moorean reasoning 
is a way of acquiring higher-level knowledge and knowledge that the skeptical 
hypotheses are false. However, it is not a way of checking of one’s beliefs in the 
denials of the skeptical hypotheses that they are true. This explanation of the 
Moorean puzzle fits well with moderate invariantism and with a SAC-based 
version of contextualism. Section 8.3 discusses a heterogeneity problem 
concerning bootstrapping and Mooreanism that existing sensitivity accounts of 
knowledge are faced with along with a generality problem about higher-level 
knowledge. It is shown that a SAC-based solution suffers neither from the 
heterogeneity problem nor from the generality problem.  
 
